MGB
MGB // Cyber Blog

Incident files

5 files · Real incidents · Timelines

Each file walks through a real incident: what happened and when, what went wrong, what worked and what would have helped. Facts come from the organisation's own statements, regulators and official evidence, and each file links its sources. The "what would have helped" sections are MGB's own analysis.

ASOS: one employee login, one push notification

An attacker impersonated a trusted contact to get an employee's login and sent an unauthorised push notification. ASOS says no payment cards or passwords were accessed, and estimates a 2 to 4% temporary hit to Group GMV.

~10am, 6 OctUnauthorised notification sent
Same dayPublic announcement
c.2-4%Estimated Group GMV impact since 6 Oct, mostly UK
16.5mActive customers at end Oct, still growing
0Payment cards or passwords accessed, per ASOS
  • Entry point: ASOS says an unauthorised party impersonated a trusted contact to obtain login credentials for an ASOS employee account.
  • Impact: The account was used to access information on certain third-party platforms and to send a push notification to some customers on 6 October 2026.
  • Data: Basic personal information such as names and contact details. ASOS says no payment card information or account passwords were accessed.
  • Response: ASOS restricted access to the platforms, brought in internal and external specialists and worked with authorities. The website and app kept running.
Read the full file with timeline →

Co-op: an account reset on the help desk

Attackers impersonated a colleague and answered the security questions to get an account reset. Alerts fired in minutes and stores stayed open, but about 40 key pieces of equipment were rebuilt and services took around two weeks to restore.

MinutesTime to first alert
~1 hrReset to malicious use
~40Key pieces of equipment rebuilt
~14 daysTo restore services
£0Ransom paid
  • Entry point: the attackers impersonated a colleague and answered security questions to get an account reset. About an hour later the account was used maliciously.
  • Response: the Co-op told MPs its systems alerted teams within minutes, and defences restricted the account. Remote access and VPN were restricted on the Sunday.
  • Spread: by 1 May the threat had spread to main controllers, and about 40 key pieces of equipment were rebuilt.
  • Outcome: member data was accessed and services took about two weeks to restore. The Co-op says it did not pay a ransom and that its response prevented ransomware being deployed.
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M&S: stores open, online closed for weeks

Contactless payments, click and collect and then online orders stopped while M&S moved processes offline. Customer data was taken, the estimated profit impact was about £300 million before mitigation, and click and collect returned in August.

~£300mEstimated 2025/26 operating profit impact, before mitigation
Late Apr to early JunFashion, Home and Beauty online paused
Early AugClick and collect returned
£101.6mIncident costs in the half year
£100.0mInsurance proceeds in the half year
  • Disruption: M&S said on 23 April that contactless payments were not being processed and click and collect was paused. Online orders were suspended on 25 April.
  • Data: M&S confirmed some customer data was taken, which may include contact details, date of birth and online order history, but not usable card details or passwords.
  • Cost: M&S estimated about £300m impact on 2025/26 operating profit before mitigation. In the half year it booked £101.6m of incident costs and £100.0m of insurance proceeds.
  • Recovery: Fashion, Home and Beauty online was paused from late April to early June, home delivery resumed in June and click and collect returned in early August.
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Microsoft: a forgotten test account

A password spray against a legacy test account gave a nation-state actor a foothold in Microsoft corporate email. It took more than six weeks to detect, and the stolen mail led to more.

Late Nov 2023Attack begins
12 Jan 2024Detected
10xPeak spray increase, Feb 2024 vs Jan
0Evidence of customer-facing systems compromised, as of Mar 2024
  • Entry point: a password spray compromised a legacy non-production test tenant account, which gave the actor a foothold.
  • Reach: the account's permissions let the actor read a very small percentage of Microsoft corporate mailboxes, including senior leadership and staff in cybersecurity and legal. The actor exfiltrated some emails and attachments.
  • Detection: Microsoft detected the attack on 12 January 2024, more than six weeks after it began in late November 2023.
  • Second order: in March 2024 Microsoft said the actor used information from the stolen email to try to reach source code repositories and internal systems, and that some customer secrets had been shared with Microsoft by email.
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Capita: 58 hours to quarantine one device

An alert fired within ten minutes of a malicious download, but the device stayed on the network for 58 hours. 6.6 million people were affected and the ICO fined Capita £14 million.

10 minTime to first alert
58 hrsTime to quarantine the device
~1 TBData taken
6.6MPeople affected
£14mICO fine
  • What happened: a malicious file downloaded on one employee device gave an attacker a foothold. They reached administrator access, moved across the network, copied out nearly a terabyte of data and deployed ransomware.
  • The gap: detection worked. The first alert was raised within ten minutes, but the device was not quarantined until 58 hours after the compromise, against a one-hour target.
  • Root causes the ICO found: no tiering model for administrator accounts, an understaffed security operations centre that had missed its response targets for months, and penetration testing that was too limited and too siloed.
  • Outcome: 6.6 million people affected and a £14 million fine, reduced from a provisional £45 million. Capita accepted liability and did not appeal.
Read the full file with timeline →