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M&S: stores open, online closed for weeks

In April 2025 Marks and Spencer moved processes offline after a cyber incident. Contactless payments stopped, click and collect paused and online orders were suspended. Customer data was taken, the estimated hit to profit ran to hundreds of millions of pounds, and online services took until the summer to return.

The short version
  • What happened: M&S disclosed a cyber incident that disrupted payments and operations, then paused online ordering. Stores stayed open throughout.
  • What was lost: some customer data, which M&S says may include contact details, date of birth and online order history. M&S says it does not include usable card details or passwords.
  • What it cost: M&S estimated about £300m impact on 2025/26 operating profit before mitigation, and reported £101.6m of incident costs in the first half.
  • What is not public: M&S's statements do not say how the attackers got in or when the intrusion began.
~£300mEstimated 2025/26 operating profit impact, before mitigation
Late Apr to early JunFashion, Home and Beauty online paused
Early AugClick and collect returned
£101.6mIncident costs in the half year
£100.0mInsurance proceeds in the half year

Timeline

Went wrong Worked Context

23 Apr 2025

M&S confirms a cyber incident. A statement says some services are disrupted. Contactless payments are not being processed, click and collect is paused and online delivery times may be delayed. Some processes have been moved offline to protect colleagues, partners, suppliers and the business. Stores stay open.

25 Apr 2025

Online orders are paused. M&S suspends orders on its websites and apps. Customers can still browse the range, and stores remain open. M&S says outside cyber experts are helping restore online and app ordering.

2 May 2025

The regulator is notified. The ICO confirms it has received reports from Marks and Spencer plc and the Co-op Group, is making enquiries and is working with the NCSC.

4 May 2025

The NCSC comments on the retail incidents. It says it has not determined whether the incidents are linked. It notes press reports linking some to Scattered Spider and suggests attackers may have posed as staff to IT help desks to get password and MFA resets.

8 May 2025

M&S confirms customer data was taken. The update says some personal customer data was taken, with no evidence it has been shared. It may include contact details, date of birth and online order history, but not usable card or payment details or account passwords. Customers are asked to reset their password at next login.

21 May 2025

M&S puts a figure on it. The full-year results announcement estimates an impact of around £300m on Group operating profit for 2025/26 before mitigation, and expects online disruption to continue through June and into July as it restarts.

June 2025

Home delivery resumes. Fashion, Home and Beauty online had been paused from late April to early June. Home delivery resumed in June.

Early Aug 2025

Click and collect returns. M&S says the customer-facing online offer was restored in August.

5 Nov 2025

Half-year results. M&S reports £101.6m of incident-related costs and £100.0m of insurance proceeds for the half year, and says practically all operational systems have been recovered, with recovery at an advanced stage.

What went wrong

  • Core customer services stopped. Contactless payments, click and collect and then online ordering were all unavailable at different points, so the impact reached customers within a day of disclosure.
  • Data was taken. Personal customer data, including contact details, date of birth and order history, was taken, and customers were asked to reset passwords.
  • Recovery took months, not days. Online fashion, home and beauty ordering was paused for around six weeks and click and collect did not return until early August.
  • The cost was large. M&S estimated about £300m impact on operating profit before mitigation, and booked £101.6m of incident costs in the half year.

What worked

  • Processes were taken offline early. M&S moved some processes offline as a proactive measure to protect colleagues, partners, suppliers and the business.
  • Stores stayed open. M&S said throughout that stores remained open, which kept part of the business trading.
  • Outside help and authorities were engaged. M&S brought in external cyber experts and reported the incident to government authorities and law enforcement.
  • Insurance softened the blow. M&S recorded £100.0m of insurance proceeds in the half year against £101.6m of incident costs.
  • Customer messages were plain. M&S told customers what was taken, what was not, that no action was needed beyond a password reset, and to be wary of messages claiming to be from M&S.

What would have helped

This section is MGB's own analysis, not part of the source material.

  • Verify identity before privileged resets. Help desks need a strong out-of-band check before resetting passwords or MFA on accounts with elevated access. The NCSC lists this as a priority.
  • Use MFA everywhere and watch for risky sign-ins. The NCSC advises MFA across the organisation, monitoring for unauthorised account use, and close checks on privileged accounts.
  • Rehearse running without core systems. A tested manual fallback for payments, click and collect and online orders shortens the time customers see a stopped service.
  • Make recovery order explicit. Know which systems must return first and how long each takes to rebuild, so restarts are planned rather than improvised.
  • Carry cover that includes business interruption. Insurance with business continuity cover is what turned a large loss into a smaller net one.
Not in the sources M&S's statements do not say how the attackers got in or when the intrusion began. The NCSC says it has not determined whether the retail incidents are linked and that press reports tie some to Scattered Spider, so this file does not name an attacker or method.